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Catastrophes from severe weather are per-haps the costliest accidents humanity faces. While we are still a long way from tech-nologies that would abate the destructive force of storms, there is much we can do to reduce their effect. True, we cannot regulate the weather, but through smart governance 
and correct incentives we can influence human exposure to the 
risk of bad weather. We may not be able to control wind or storm 
surge, but we can prompt people to build sturdier homes with 
stronger roofs far from floodplains. We call these catastrophes 
“natural disasters,” but they are the result of a combination of nat-
ural forces and, we show here, often imprudent and shortsighted 
human decisions induced by questionable government policies.
Regulating weather risk is an increasingly urgent social issue. 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012 brought 
unprecedented property damage to the Gulf and coastal north-
eastern states. as a result of an enormous development enterprise, 
the majority of florida real estate now lies in coastal areas affected 
by hurricane activity. and the potential rise of sea level and the 
resulting erosion of the coastline are putting at risk large chunks 
of prime real estate in numerous regions.
Omr i Ben-Shahar is the Leo and eileen herzel Professor of Law and Kearney 
Director of the Coase-Sandor institute for Law and economics at the University of 
Chicago. KyLe LOgUe is the Wade h. and Dores m. mcCree Collegiate Professor of 
Law at the University of michigan Law School.
This article is condensed from their paper, “The Perverse effects of Subsidized 
Weather insurance,” forthcoming in  the Stanford Law Review, Vol. 68.




These programs are a boon to the wealthy and encourage  
development in disaster-prone areas.



















Our thesis is simple: the most effective way to prepare for 
storms is through disaster insurance. But this preparation would 
not simply take the form that is commonly thought: insurance as 
a form of post-disaster relief. Rather, we see insurance as a form 
of private regulation of safety—a contractual device controlling 
and incentivizing behavior prior to the occurrence of losses. 
Buying insurance is a transaction in which policyholders are 
prompted to adopt loss mitigation measures. Insurance contracts 
attach prices to risky behavior and thus force insurance buyers to 
factor the risk into their decision. Homeowners’ property insur-
ance, by pricing the cost of choosing to live in the path of storms, 
sends a crucial price signal that could be a key ingredient in driv-
ing community development and individual location decisions. 
Unfortunately, in the United States, insurance is denied its 
potential role as an efficient regulator of pre-storm conduct. It 
does not give people price signals regarding the cost of living in 
severe weather regions and it does not induce rational community 
development and infrastructure investment. american insurance 
fails to achieve those straightforward and enormously important 
roles for a simple reason: it is provided by the government in a sub-
sidized manner. Insurance premiums are deliberately suppressed—
often dramatically so—thus failing to alert private parties who 
purchase property insurance to the true risk of living dangerously. 
It allows those private parties to (rationally) assume excessive risk 
and dump the cost of their coastal living upon taxpayers. We argue 
that much of the development of storm-stricken coastal areas is 



















This is only the first part of the bad news. There is more, and 
it gets uglier. Public debates over subsidized weather insurance 
often ignore the over-development and excessive risk distortion, 
because they focus on a myth: the myth that insurance must always 
be affordable. Subsidies are necessary, policymakers have told us 
repeatedly, because they help support low-income and working-
class people who might otherwise be unable to afford insurance 
and would not be able to remain in their homes. Subsidizing 
weather insurance is “our moral duty to the poorest people and 
working people and lower middle income people,” in the words of 
then-congressman Barney frank (D–Mass.). The subsidies prevent 
“working families who are doing everything they can to put food on 
the table” from losing their homes, according to Sen. M. K. “Heidi” 
Heitkamp (D–N.D.). The subsidy, in other words, is thought to pro-
mote a redistribution that benefits economically weak populations. 
We have long suspected that this justification is false. Our 
suspicion rested on the puzzling differential treatment of hur-
ricanes versus tornados. These two types of severe storms cause 
similar aggregate magnitudes of property destruction, but federal 
subsidies apply to flood losses caused by hurricanes, not to wind 
losses caused by tornadoes. This was puzzling because hurricane 
victims live closer to water than tornado victims, and it is generally 
known that living close to water is a privilege of the affluent. This 
pattern seemed inconsistent with the affordability-of-insurance 
rationale. We therefore studied the insurance data and we now 
have evidence that the weather insurance subsidy scheme is indeed 
a boon to the elite; a redistribution in favor of the wealthy. We 
present this new evidence here.
Our study, and in particular our findings regarding the myth 
of affordability, are intended to shed light on recent legislative 
activity, which unfortunately only made things worse. In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy and the enormous bill that the 
U.S. federal Emergency Management agency—the agency that 
administers the federal subsidies for flood insurance—had to foot, 
Congress with bipartisan support enacted the Biggert–Waters 
flood Insurance Reform act of 2012. It intended to scale back 
the subsidies and had the potential to provide better incentives 
for human preparedness for floods. 
But Congress did not let this laudable new statute live long 
enough to do any good. Immediately after it was enacted, subsidy 
recipients—now scheduled to lose their subsidies—protested. Con-
gress quickly reacted—again, with a rare showing of bipartisan con-
sensus—enacting what amounts to almost a full repeal of the 2012 
reform. The Homeowner flood Insurance affordability act of 2014 
restored virtually all of the federal subsidies and cross-subsidies 
for flood insurance. Our results show that the rhetorical premise 
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invoked by supporters of this act—that hard-working low-income 
people need it to keep their homes—is misguided. The beneficiaries 
of weather insurance subsidies are not low-income folks.
The exiSTing SUBSiDy SCheme
Historically, flood risks were covered through private insur-
ance, if policyholders purchased it as an added coverage, priced 
separately from the basic homeowners policy. But many property 
owners opted not to purchase the flood coverage, political and 
public pressure often led to the federal government providing 
post-disaster relief, and some floods were simply mind-bog-
glingly large, producing wide-scale flood-related losses. Those 
realities led Congress to create the National flood Insurance 
Program (NfIP). Through it, the federal government under-
writes flood insurance policies at rates that are set by fEMa 
and subsidized by the Treasury Department. Of course, in the 
presence of such subsidized options, private companies cannot 
compete in this niche, and government-provided flood policies 
dominate the market. 
The goal of the NfIP was to condition participation in the 
subsidized program on communities’ adoption of floodplain 
management ordinances that reduce future flood risks to new 
construction. Congress also made the purchase of NfIP policies 
mandatory for properties that are in certain flood zones and 
that are subject to federally regulated mortgages. But the rates 
charged by NfIP to its policyholders violate basic insurance 
fundamentals. first, they are based on flood maps that are often 
out of date. Second, property owners in high-risk areas pay well 
below actuarial rates. and third, political influence, rather than 
market forces, shapes the process of characterizing particular 
areas as flood-prone and eligible for subsidies. 
 The NfIP has been operating at a massive deficit, estimated 
in 2012 to be around $24 billion. That prompted lawmakers to 
enact the Biggert–Waters act, initiating a gradual elimination of 
the subsidies. The act was designed to phase out the subsidies 
entirely for certain “repetitive loss properties,” second homes, 
business properties, homes that have been substantially improved 
or damaged, and homes sold to new owners. It also permitted a 
faster pace of rate increases (25 percent annually, up from the 
previous 10 percent rate hike cap). 
However, the backlash from property owners along coastal 
areas, where resulting premium increases were the greatest, was 
swift and effective. In some areas, there were reports of homeown-
ers’ premiums rising 10-fold. The concern expressed by many 
lawmakers, on behalf of their angry constituents, was that unless 
the new law was repealed, people wouldn’t be able to remain in 
their homes. 
The political pressure was so successful that even Rep. Maxine 
Waters (D–Calif.), one of the co-authors of the 2012 legislation, 
voted in favor of repealing it. In 2014, Congress passed the Home-
owner flood Insurance affordability act, which largely restored 
the old subsidy scheme. for example, the new law also called on 
fEMa to keep premiums at no more than 1 percent of the value 
of the coverage, which in many flood territories is dramatically 
below true risk.
Wind insurance / another category of large-scale, government-
sold insurance for weather risk includes state-owned insurance 
corporations that specialize in wind-damage coverage. Most 
prominent among them is florida’s Citizens Property Insurance 
Corporation, which provides the vast majority of the wind insur-
ance for properties on the coast of florida. 
like a private insurance company, Citizens prices its policies 
based on risk. It divides the state into 150 geographic rating 
territories and sets its rates based on weather patterns, construc-
tion methods, and past losses in each territory. But there is one 
big difference compared to private insurance. like the premi-
ums charged for flood coverage at the federal level by NfIP, the 
premiums Citizens collects from florida policyholders are far 
below what is necessary to cover the full risk, and are politically 
mandated to be so (as state regulations limit Citizens’ ability to 
raise rates). Citizens does not face the same loss constraints that 
private insurers do; if the premiums are not enough to pay for 
the wind damage, Citizens can cover the shortfall by passing it 
on to florida’s taxpayers. 
affOrDaBiLiTy? 
The subsidies embodied in government insurance are an 
intended feature because they are thought to favor economically 
weak homeowners; they are definitely not thought to be a bailout 
for the rich. “This is not about the millionaires in mansions on 
the beach…. These are middle-class, working people living in 
normal, middle-class houses doing their best to raise their kids, 
contribute to their communities, and make a living,” explained 
then-senator Mary landrieu (D–la.). This perception explains 
why even people not affected by weather insurance subsidies (but 
who, perhaps unbeknownst to them, pay taxes to fund them) 
strongly support the subsidies. In one survey, only 15 percent 
of unaffected florida citizens supported the premium increases. 
The cross-subsidy created by government-sold insurance follows, 
then, a distinct logic: it moves from people lucky enough to live in 
safe areas (“the affluent”) to the less lucky residents living in low-
lying areas in storms’ paths (“the poor”). But this conjecture, that 
subsidized flood insurance benefits the less affluent, had not been 
tested. We long believed that it is wrong and that the opposite is 
true: the subsidy accrues primarily to the affluent. This, for a simple 
reason: those who need flood insurance most are the habitants of 
properties build in proximity to the coast, where severe weather 
strikes most forcefully. You don’t need to be a real estate economist 
to know that people pay a premium to live close to the water. are 
we really asking middle-class taxpayers to subsidize beachfront 
property owners, all in the guise of “affordability”?
To test this hypothesis, we examined florida’s wind-peril 
insurance policies, which are sold and subsidized by the state-
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owned Citizens. Those data include information about each 
individual policy and the actual premium charged. also, by state 
law, the data have to include an exact estimate of the subsidy 
enjoyed by each policyholder—namely, how much more Citizens 
would need to charge this policyholder to bring the premium 
to its hypothetical true risk level, which would not require a 
subsidy from the state. 
We wanted to see where the subsidies are concentrated. Do they 
accrue to wealthier households? for that, we used two proxies for 
household wealth. (Citizens’ data do not include personal identi-
fiers and thus could not be matched with any direct measure of 
wealth.) The first measure is Household Value: knowing the ZIP 
codes of the insured properties, we were able to examine whether 
subsidies are correlated with median household value within 
the ZIP code. The second measure is 
Coverage Limit: knowing the amount of 
insurance purchased under each policy, 
we could use that as a measure of the 
property’s value. 
The first thing our tests showed 
was that higher-wealth ZIP codes in 
florida are the beneficiaries of higher 
subsidies. figure 1 offers a scatterplot 
of the trend. 
a similar picture emerges if we look 
at policy level data and ask whether 
high-value policies (those attached 
to high-value homes) receive a higher 
or lower subsidy. We divided Citizens’ 
policies into five quintiles according to 
the policy coverage amount. for each 
quintile, we calculated the average subsidy. In figure 
2 we see a clear picture: higher quintiles of wealth get 
a higher absolute subsidy.
These visual tests were complemented by regres-
sion analysis, and the results were striking: a 1 per-
cent increase in the Coverage variable is associated 
with a 1.052 percent increase in the subsidy. Simply 
put, if property a is worth twice as much as property 
B, and thus the owner of property a purchases cov-
erage that is 100 percent greater than the coverage 
purchased by the owner of property B, the owner of 
a enjoys on average a 105 percent higher absolute 
subsidy. These results are highly statistically signifi-
cant and were replicated in various specifications of 
the statistical model. 
The bottom line is clear: the wind insurance 
subsidies within Citizens’ policies accrue dispro-
portionately to affluent households and the magni-
tude of this regressive redistribution is substantial. 
While we are unable to measure directly the wealth 
of policyholders, we showed that people who buy 
higher coverage (namely, who own more expensive homes)—or, 
alternatively, people who live in wealthier ZIP codes—receive 
larger subsidies, both in absolute magnitude and as a percentage 
of their premium.
The estimates we derived for the correlation between wealth 
and subsidy probably understate the true magnitude of the pro-
affluent advantage. first, one of our measures of wealth—the 
policy coverage limit—is capped by Citizens’ rules, which means 
that we are not measuring the true wealth of the people who buy 
maximal coverage, and thus we are deriving downward-biased cor-
relations. Second, Citizens’ report of the subsidies—the indicated 
rate changes—understates the subsidies’ true magnitude. Citizens 
does not take into account some of the costs of providing insur-
ance—costs that private insurers would incur in running an insur-
ance scheme. Specifically, when Citizens 
calculates the amount of the indicated 
rate change, the insurer does not build 
into the new rate the cost of reinsur-
ance—an insurance reserve necessary 
to protect it against the risk of pricing 
errors or unexpected spikes in losses. 
Citizens does not need such a reserve 
because of its power, in effect, to tax 
the citizenry or to assess all insurance 
purchasers in the state of florida. 
We have not tried to identify the 
causal story underlying this correlation, 
nor are we interested in its direction. 
Causation may go either way: greater 
wealth may help people secure greater 
subsidies, or greater subsidies may help 
figure 1
REGRESSIvE SUBSIDY
Wind insurance subsidies and median household income for florida ZIP codes.




























































PRICIER HOMES, BIGGER SUBSIDIES
absolute dollar value subsidy by house value
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people move into more expensive homes. We are not interested in 
causation because the troubling feature of the system has nothing 
to do with any causal theory. The problem is the large positive cor-
relation between wealth and subsidy—a correlation that conflicts 
with the goals and underlying rhetoric justifying the program.
We have strong reasons to believe that a similar pattern occurs 
under other government weather insurance subsidies, like the 
federal flood insurance program. People insured by the NfIP pay 
only a fraction of the full-risk premium. In 2006, fEMa estimated 
this fraction to be 35–40 percent. Estimated by the Congressional 
Budget Office, an average premium charged by the NfIP was $721, 
but would cost $1,800–$2,060 without subsidy. CBO also found 
that “properties covered under the NfIP tend to be more valuable 
than other properties nationwide.” While the median value of a 
U.S. home that year was $160,000, the median value estimated for 
homes insured by the NfIP ranged from $220,000 to $400,000. 
The CBO found that “much of the difference is attributable to 
the higher property values in area that 
are close to water.” There are 130 million 
homes in the United States, but only a 
small fraction of them receive subsidized 
NfIP policies. Of those that do, nearly 80 
percent are located in counties that rank 
in the wealthiest quintile.
Despite the image—often invoked in 
political debates over flood insurance—of 
the subsidy going to struggling middle-
class homeowners who have lived for 
generations in floodplains, the reality is 
different. The CBO found that 40 percent of the subsidized 
coast properties in the sample are worth more than $500,000; 
12 percent are worth more than $1 million. These are far higher 
proportions than in the rest of the country. for inland properties 
(the great majority of which do not purchase flood insurance), 
only 15 percent are worth more than $500,000 and only 3 percent 
more than $1 million. 
The myth of the subsidized struggling homeowner is further 
dispelled by another striking fact: 23 percent of subsidized coastal 
properties are not the policyholders’ principal residence—they are 
either vacation homes or year-round rentals. Some 47 percent of the 
subsidized homes that are not principal residences are worth more 
than $500,000 (and 15 percent are worth more than $1 million). 
inVeSTmenT DiSTOrTiOnS
Our discussion so far shows that government insurance produces 
undesirable distributive effects: the benefits of the programs flow 
disproportionately to the affluent. But there is another troubling 
distortion of the existing government insurance programs: the 
effect on total welfare. The primary distortion is the location of 
communities: too close to the path of storms.
Insurance, if priced accurately, provides an important service 
of signaling to people the risk cost of living near water. This is 
a general (desirable) feature of insurance, operating in effect like 
a Pigouvian tax in internalizing an otherwise overlooked cost, 
helping to make an informed cost-benefit calculation in choos-
ing locations. Subsidized insurance rates destroy the information 
value of full-risk premiums, thus suppressing the true cost of 
living in severe weather zones and creating an excessive incentive 
to populate attractive but dangerous locations. 
Underpricing flood insurance in coastal areas has long been 
associated with (and likely contributed to) excessive private devel-
opment of flood zones. We know, for example, that the damage 
costs of hurricanes have increased dramatically over the past 
generation. But strikingly, much of the upward trend in storm 
loss data, after careful adjustment for societal factors, can be 
explained not by weather fluctuations, but rather by increased 
concentration of property in dangerous areas. 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau, the number of people 
living in coastal areas in florida increased by 10 million—almost 
fourfold—between 1960 and 2008. Coastal exposure now represents 
79 percent of all property exposure in florida, with an insured 
value of $2.8 trillion (in 2012). Major hurricanes did nothing to 
stop this migration. It is estimated that since Hurricane andrew 
struck the florida coast in 1992, development more than doubled 
the property value on its path. according to the Government 
accountability Office, the $25 billion in total economic losses 
andrew caused in 1992 would have resulted in more than twice 
that amount—$55 billion—were it to have occurred in 2005.
The effect of the government insurance subsidy on homeown-
ers’ location decisions can be further captured by the following 
finding: according to the Heinz Center for Science, Economics, 
and the Environment, in some of the areas closest to the shore-
line, annual insurance rates have to be set at a whopping $11.40 
per $100 of coverage to meet the risk projections. That’s over 10 
percent of property value each year! at the same time, a survey of 
homeowners found that participation in insurance schemes with 
such high premiums would be “quite low”—about half of flood 
policyholders are only willing to pay $1–$2 per $100 of annual 
insurance coverage.
Not surprisingly, given the substantial subsidy provided by 
NfIP insurance and the increased development along coastal 
areas, the number of policies issued by NfIP increased in the 
Despite the image that storm insurance subsidies go to  
the middle class, 40 percent of insured coastal properties 
in a CBO sample were worth more than $500,000 and  
12 percent were worth more than $ 1 million.
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past generation from 1.9 million to over 4.6 million. Some of 
those policyholders have lived in the area long before the NfIP, 
but many are newcomers, representing a repopulation enterprise 
facilitated by distorted insurance contracts. In the absence of 
subsidized premiums, many of these newcomers would not have 
moved to their present high-risk location or would not have paid 
the current high prices for the property. Indeed, one of the major 
complaints of existing homeowners against the Biggert–Waters 
act was that they were unable to afford the new premiums and the 
new premiums were “scaring the bejesus out of people,” making 
mortgage loans unaffordable and driving away potential buyers. 
The enD Of gOVernmenT WeaTher inSUranCe?
In delivering a subsidy that private insurance does not give, gov-
ernment insurance inflicts two distortions: regressive redistribu-
tion and inefficient investment in residential property. Those 
distortions are not inherent to the function of insurance. They 
can be attenuated, and perhaps solved, by a return to private 
insurance markets. 
Is there a market failure in property insurance markets justify-
ing government takeover? It is unlikely that people underappre-
ciate the need for such insurance, given the salience of weather 
catastrophes. It is possible that some people truly cannot afford 
flood or wind coverage, relying instead on post-disaster relief. 
But that is hardly a justification for the existing government-run 
insurance programs. Instead of being the provider of insurance, 
the government can simply mandate flood insurance in areas 
where some costs are otherwise shifted to the public (as it does 
for homes with federally guaranteed mortgage loans). Or it can 
direct subsidies only to the truly needy. 
and if private markets turn out not to have the capacity to 
cover all of the flood and wind risk that would be left uncovered 
should all the current government subsidies be repealed wholesale, 
a much more effective form of subsidy would be something along 
the lines of the recently renewed Terrorism Risk Insurance act. 
Under such a regime, the federal government would play the role 
of reinsurer of last resort, leaving the private market to cover all 
losses up to a very high trigger point, which could be in the tens 
or even hundreds of billions of dollars.
We can end this article with a call for ending government-run 
weather insurance, replacing it with pinpointed, need-based sub-
sidies. This would eliminate the inefficient incentives to develop 
and redevelop coastal land, as well as the regressive redistribution. 
But where is the sense in such a naive proposal? 
Congress did enact a law to eliminate the flood insurance 
subsidies—a bipartisan law remarkably passed in the peak days of 
partisan gridlock—only to quickly toss it out in favor of an even 
more widely supported bill reinstating the subsidies. Insurance 
affordability, it turns out, is one of the most effective political 
calls to arms, in this case resulting in a premium scheme that 
will likely remain in place for decades. We can only contribute to 
clarifying its enormous social cost.
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